

## Nukespeak translated to plain English

1. **Synergy**: It sounds so positive, as in “Synergy is the creation of a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.” A company like Entergy, the second largest nuclear utility in the U.S., often brags up its ability to apply “lessons learned” from across its dirty dozen atomic reactors. In full page ads taken out in newspapers across Michigan a few months ago, Palisades’ site director, Anthony Vitale, apologized for his reactor’s terrible record in 2011 and 2012, and the complete collapse of its “safety culture,” promising to apply synergies of expertise, protocols, and standards from the rest of the company’s fleet. Never mind that Entergy had already owned Palisades for well over 5 years, as well as the fact that other Entergy reactors – from Vermont Yankee, to Indian Point near New York City, to Pilgrim near Boston, and beyond – are among the most controversial in the country. On the eve of the 16<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the beginning of the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe, Entergy V.P. Jay Thayer wrote to NRC re: revisions to Entergy’s Quality Assurance Program Manual: “The Chief Operating Officer provides guidance with regards to company quality assurance policy and for incorporating alignment, consistency and **synergy** with the Entergy Nuclear-Northeast quality assurance policy.” (April 25, 2002, <http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0212/ML021280592.pdf>). Thayer was busted a couple years ago for lying under oath to State of Vermont officials regarding underground pipes leaking radioactivity into soil, groundwater, and surface waters at the Vermont Yankee atomic reactor. Although he was “relieved of his duties” (that is, transferred), the Governor and State Legislature of the Green Mountain State have regarded Entergy as a “rogue corporation” ever since.

2. **Non-cited violations**: The vast majority of Entergy regulatory violations, no matter how serious, often go “non-cited.” That is, with little to no accountability or consequence, such as an enforcement action, let alone a monetary fine, wrong doer penalty, or any other meaningful sanction. In this sense, they are mere slaps on the wrist. One example of a non-cited violation at Palisades: the October 2005 cask dangle for 2 days over the high-level radioactive waste storage pool. A crane subcontractor, in a hurry to leave for vacation, set the crane wrong, so that it was unable to lift a 107-ton, fully loaded high-level radioactive waste transfer cask. Luckily, the emergency brake engaged. But Palisades personnel, in their ignorance, attempted to release the emergency brake. If they had succeeded, the hurtling heavy load could have punched a hole in the bottom of the pool, draining away the cooling water supply. A radioactive waste inferno would have ensued, releasing catastrophic amounts of hazardous radioactivity into the environment to blow downwind, flow downstream, poison up the food chain, and harm down the generations, over a wide area. Not only did NRC Region 3 deem the “incident” non-citable, it was also deemed “not reportable.” Watchdogs only found out about it by a fluke two months later, then had to make a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to NRC for documentation, a process that took four additional months. (See NIRS backgrounder, <http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensing/caskdanglesummaryreport4406.pdf>; and *Detroit Free Press* front page article, “Nuclear Safety Left Hanging as Crane Dangled Fuel Rods: Michigan Incident Got Warning But No Fine,” March 18, 2006).

3. **Allegation**: NRC’s website begins to define “allegation” as: “A declaration, statement, or assertion of impropriety or inadequacy associated with NRC-regulated activities, the validity of which has not been established.”

But then NRC goes on, at length, in legalese, to define “allegation” by the many things it is **not**:

“Excluded from this definition are technical questions generated by NRC staff, inadequacies provided to NRC staff by licensee employees acting in their official capacity,<sup>(1)</sup> matters already entered into a licensee’s corrective action program that are not otherwise accompanied by an assertion of inadequate licensee followup,<sup>(2)</sup> matters being handled by other formal processes, such as petitions filed in accordance with [10 CFR 2.206](#) or contentions filed in hearings or other formal proceedings, misconduct by NRC employees or NRC contractors, non-radiological occupational health and safety issues, concerns related to Agreement State

licensee activities when the concerned individual agrees with the provision of his or her concerns and identifying information to the Agreement State for concern evaluation, performance or wrongdoing concerns regarding organizations or personnel from State regulatory bodies that oversee Agreement State licensee activities, matters reported to NRC by Agreement States resulting from Agreement State inspections or licensing activities that are forwarded to NRC as a matter of conducting official business, and matters involving law enforcement and other Government agencies. Of note, while not from a source external to NRC, matters identified by NRC staff that involve potential wrongdoing and that prompt investigation by OI are also tracked as allegations to facilitate program and regional office monitoring of related OI followup. It is also noted that allegation concerns are not limited to matters that constitute a potential violation of NRC requirements.<sup>(3)</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>This exclusion is intended to clarify that inadequacies discussed during official routine conversations between licensee employees and NRC staff are not intended to be treated as allegations. However, if the information provided by the licensee employee involves a wrongdoing issue or the employee expresses dissatisfaction with the licensee's handling of the issue or another licensee, the information should be treated as an allegation.

<sup>2</sup>Licensee corrective action processes provide the primary mechanism for the identification and resolution of problems. Once an issue is entered into the corrective action process, the licensee evaluates an identified problem, categorizes it in terms of safety significance, and takes action toward resolution. Unless a concerned individual can articulate why an item entered into the corrective action process was not or will not be handled properly by the licensee, such items should not be processed as allegations.

<sup>3</sup>As an example, a concern about a safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) problem at a facility is an allegation because of its potential bearing on the willingness of personnel to raise safety issues associated with NRC-regulated activities. While a substantiated concern in this area provides important input to the NRC's assessment of facility performance, a Notice of Violation cannot be issued, because there is no applicable regulation."

In early Nov., 2011, David Lochbaum, Nuclear Safety Director at Union of Concerned Scientists, filed allegations against the Davis-Besse atomic reactor near Toledo, concerning its recent revelation of severe cracking of its concrete containment shell, or "Shield Building." NRC has yet to adequately respond, or respond at all, to Lochbaum's allegations. Davis-Besse is allowed to operate at full power, despite a potentially fatal flaw in its radiological containment systems, structures, and components.

4. ***Burden reduction:*** In essence, this can mean weakening safety regulations so that age-degraded atomic reactors like Palisades are enabled to continue operating, despite the risks. In the kick off article in a major, 4 part exposé by the *Associated Press* in June 2011, for example, NRC regulatory rollbacks on its "Pressurized Thermal Shock" (PTS) regulations were cited as a leading example of such risk-taking tied to prioritizing nuclear utility profits above public safety. Palisades happens to have the worst embrittled reactor pressure vessel in the U.S. Palisades violated NRC PTS standards in 1981, just 10 years into operations. NRC has had to weaken its PTS regulations numerous times since, in order to accommodate Palisades. If Palisades' Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) ever activates, it risks fracturing the RPV due to the sudden temperature drop, combined with around a ton of pressure per square inch on the brittle metal. There is no contingency if the RPV fractures. The primary coolant water would turn to steam and escape the breach. The core would meltdown. If the meltdown burned through containment, a catastrophic radioactivity release would unfold.

In this sense, "burden reduction" is closely related to an oft-used phrase in the nuclear establishment, "***effective and efficient regulation.***" Effectiveness and efficiency are touted NRC regulatory goals. However, this often turns out to be, effectively, an expedited rubber-stamp that prioritizes "production" (industry profit) over safety risks. Entergy's internal safety culture survey in early 2012 (covered up by the company and even NRC, until Palisades whistleblowers brought it out) revealed that a large part of Palisades' workforce believes Entergy's priority is production over safety. NRC's Office of Inspector General reported in late 2002 that NRC, including Region 3 Staff, prioritized production over safety,

which led to the nearest-miss to a nuclear accident since Three Mile Island, at Davis-Besse, OH in 2002 (the Hole-in-the-Head reactor lid corrosion fiasco). Palisades' lid itself is severely corroded, and is more than 5 years overdue for replacement.

5. ***Enhanced/Increased oversight and inspections:*** "Oversight" is a word which has mutually contradictory definitions: both "supervision, watchful care," as well as "an omission or error due to carelessness; unintentional failure to notice or consider; lack of proper attention." Given the fact that Palisades has suffered numerous leaks and breakdowns in 2012, even after NRC supposedly enhanced its "oversight" and increased inspections due to Palisades' "degraded cornerstone" (multiple serious violations which resulted in NRC lowering Palisades' safety status to 1 of the 4 worst-run reactors in the country) resulting from 5 "unplanned shutdowns" (accidents and breakdowns) in 2011, this begs the question as to which definition of "oversight" NRC means?!

On Mon., Sept. 17th, and continuing through Fri., Sept. 28th, a team of NRC inspectors descended on Palisades for an "IP95002 supplemental inspection." But Entergy had been given a 7-month advance notice. Last Valentine's Day, when NRC designated Palisades as one of the four worst-run atomic reactors in the U.S., it generously allowed Entergy as long as it needed to get back to it as to when it would be ready for a supplemental inspection. Thus, it took Entergy over half a year to "clean house."

6. ***Revisit:*** A form of NRC and industry collusion in which resolution of risks and problems are deferred indefinitely, or permanently, into the future, while reactors are allowed to operate at full power in the "interim." For example, despite a near catastrophe at the Browns Ferry Unit 1 atomic reactor in Alabama in 1975 due to a major fire, NRC has not instituted meaningful fire protection upgrades since, at most reactors across the country, including at Browns Ferry Unit 1 itself. Palisades' previous owner, Consumers Energy, in spring 2006 cited "fire protection requirements" as one of many costly safety upgrades it could not afford, thus explaining its decision to sell the reactor to Entergy. But Entergy has yet to make many, if any, such fire protection upgrades, despite owning Palisades for 6 years.

7. ***Strategic plan:*** Entergy's "strategic plan," its unwritten business model, is infamous: "Buy old reactors dirt cheap, then run them into the ground." Thus allowing Entergy's previous CEO, J. Wayne Leonard, to make \$20 million and more per year, while major safety repairs go undone. Given the 6 years overdue replacement of Palisades' corroded lid as well as its deteriorating steam generators (for the 2<sup>nd</sup> time in the reactor's history), and lack of action on Palisades' worst embrittled reactor pressure vessel in the country, combined with the complete collapse of safety culture and NRC complicity, perhaps no other of Entergy's dirty dozen atomic reactors nationwide is at more risk of meltdown than Palisades.

8. ***Risk-informed:*** Closely related to PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment). Risk is defined as probability times consequences. But NRC and industry often downplay probability to the point of assuming it is effectively zero, excusing the fact that consequences are rarely addressed, as supposedly the risk is too improbable to ever happen. But the risk of the Space Shuttle Challenger exploding on lift-off was 1 in 100,000 – before it did; then it was determined to be 1 in 25 (the number of previous Shuttle launches). How "probable" was it on 3/11/11 that a 9.0 earthquake and 45 foot tall tsunami would cause three meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant? How probable was it that a near-electrocution due to safety shortcuts would cut off power to half the control room at Palisades on 9/25/11, taking multiple safety systems to the brink of breakdown, risking a Loss of Coolant Accident, potential meltdown and catastrophic radioactivity release – an accident that did not even earn Palisades a "Red finding," NRC's worst risk designation, begging the question, what does it take?! "***Risk-informed***" often means that NRC weakens regulations, or nuclear utilities forego safety upgrades, all in order to save money, under the dubious assumption that the accident scenario is too improbable to ever occur.

9. **Robust**: Perhaps there is nothing so “strongly built” as NRC’s bulwark against public or even state government resistance to 20-year reactor license extensions. NRC has rubberstamped 73 such “renewals” since the year 2000. Environmental interveners at Palisades were royally steamrolled in 2006-2007, including by NRC Office of General Counsel intimidation of a retired NRC whistleblower, Demetrios Basdekas, who had revealed embrittled reactor pressure vessel vulnerability to pressurized thermal shock in a 1982 *New York Times* editorial. After the intimidation, Basdekas decided not to continue working with the interveners.

NRC also overrode a 26 to 4 vote by the State of Vermont Senate, which blocked Entergy’s 20-year license extension at Vermont Yankee atomic reactor, a Fukushima Daiichi twin design (General Electric Mark I Boiling Water Reactor). NRC did this a couple weeks after the Japanese nuclear catastrophe had begun. The State of Vermont, and its citizens, continue to strongly resist NRC’s rubberstamp at every available opportunity.

The State of New York is also actively resisting Entergy’s bid to extend operations at the twin reactor Indian Point nuclear power plant very near New York City. Recently, the NY Attorney General’s successful lawsuit against NRC’s Orwellian “Nuclear Waste Confidence Decision” means NRC cannot rubberstamp Indian Point’s license extension for at least 2 more years, if not longer.

10. **Safety**: The word often deployed by NRC and industry to speak about “all things nuclear” (the title of an excellent Union of Concerned Scientists blog by Nuclear Safety Director David Lochbaum) in place of the more appropriate word **risk**. While aspects of reactor operations and radioactive waste storage could be made **safer**, no normal sense of the word “safe” applies to nuclear power from the get-go. For example, Palisades’ high-level radioactive waste could be more safely stored in dry casks, but even under the best circumstances, dry casks cannot be called “safe.” They are not designed to withstand terrorist attacks, for example. But at Palisades, dry cask storage is located a mere 100 yards from the waters of Lake Michigan, source of drinking water for 40 million people downstream. The dry casks are stored in violation of NRC earthquake safety regulations, as revealed by NRC inspector Dr. Ross Landsman in 1994. Palisades’ casks have poor to non-existent quality assurance, calling into question their structural integrity. The 4<sup>th</sup> one to be loaded, in June 1994, has defective welds. A Palisades dry cask experienced a hydrogen gas fire during loading; an identical dry cask at Point Beach, WI actually suffered a hydrogen explosion.

11. **Value-added**: This usually means “something, as an item of equipment, that has been added to a product by a marketer or distributor to warrant markup in the retail price.” The phrase should not be used at Palisades. When Entergy bought Palisades for pennies on the dollar, it then successfully triumphed over the Attorney General of the State of Michigan, as well as a consortium of the state’s dozen biggest manufacturers (and hence consumers of electricity), not to mention household ratepayers, in locking in a highly profitable charge for electricity rates. Also as part of the sale from Consumers Energy to Entergy, the decommissioning (dismantlement and clean-up) fund at Palisades was looted to the tune of \$316 million, with the approval of the MI Public Service Commission as well as NRC. Thus, MI ratepayers will get to pay again to replenish the clean-up fund, while nuclear utility executives and shareholders make off like bandits.

12. **Outcome driven**: As indicated above, the outcome which seems to drive not only Entergy, but also NRC, is nuclear utility “production” – that is, profit.

13. **Performance based**: Might this form of influence on nuclear safety regulation refer to the “performance” of nuclear industry lobbyists? Nuclear lobbyists swarm NRC’s headquarters on a continual basis, as they do the Halls of Congress. Judy Pasternak, investigative reporter at American University, documented in 2010 that the nuclear power industry had spent \$645 million between 1999 and 2009 on lobbying the federal government alone. That’s \$1.25 million per week, for a decade. Then, \$65 million in campaign contributions was added.

14. **Think Outside The Box**: The box that NRC and industry need to think outside of is the one that says nothing can go wrong, and utility profits trump public safety. Also, the “black box” from which the Palisades’

embrittled reactor pressure vessel pressurized thermal shock “all clear” keeps coming out of, needs to be done away with (a form of regulatory rollback obscured by technical calculations and “revised methodologies”)!

15. **Public confidence**: As stated by a leader of the Western Shoshone Indian National Council when an NRC licensing board allowed the pro-Yucca dump States of South Carolina and Washington into the proceeding 2 years after the deadline to do so, “NRC stands for No Remaining Credibility”; if anti-dump interveners had missed a single deadline at any point during the hyper-legalistic proceeding, they would be thrown out!

Concerned local residents and environmental watchdogs at Palisades have also often been treated with bad faith by NRC, right up to the present moment. The public has less than zero confidence in NRC, a rogue agency.

16. **Result driven**: NRC should be driven by its mandate, to protect public health, safety, and the environment. Instead, the results that seem to matter are Entergy’s bottom line, and pleasing U.S. Rep. Fred Upton (R-MI). After all, Upton pressured NRC’s Commissioners this summer to take Palisades off its short list of worst-run reactors ASAP. Entergy was one of Upton’s biggest campaign contributors in the last election. NRC obliged Upton a month ago, despite ongoing leaks throughout 2012. But then again, Upton is chair of the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee, which oversees NRC activities and the agency’s budget. When NRC Chairwoman Shirley Jackson butted heads with U.S. Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) over nuclear safety in the mid-1990s, he threatened to slash NRC’s budget by half if the Chairwoman didn’t back down. She did.

17. **Empower or Empowerment**: Entergy Nuclear’s most ironic slogan is “The Power of People.” A deepening network of communities living in the shadows of Entergy’s dirty dozen atomic reactors nationwide – “Entergy Watch” -- is hoping to show Entergy just what “People Power versus Nuclear Power” is all about. They’ve even launched “Occupy Entergy” actions, such as on March 22, 2012, when 168 people were arrested (at Entergy’s state HQ in Vernon, VT; regional HQ in White Plains, NY; and national HQ in New Orleans), protesting NRC’s 20-year rubberstamp at Vermont Yankee on the very first day of the license extension.

18. **Rigorous**: NRC claims that its regulations and enforcement are rigorous, but this is far from the truth. Rigorous is defined as “rigidly severe or harsh, as people, rules, or discipline,” as well as “uncomfortably severe or harsh; extremely inclement” (as with weather or climate). In this sense, what is rigorous are the inescapable consequences from a meltdown and containment breach at Palisades. NRC commissioned a study, CRAC-2 (Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences) carried out by Sandia National Labs, which found that a catastrophic radioactivity release from Palisades could cause 1,000 “Peak Early Fatalities” (such as radiation poisoning deaths); 7,000 “Peak Early Injuries”; 10,000 “Peak [latent] Cancer Deaths”; and more than \$50 billion in property damages. However, populations have soared downwind and downstream of Palisades in the past 40 years (CRAC-2 was based on 1970 U.S. Census data), so casualties would now be significantly worse. And, when adjusted for inflation, property damages would approach \$120 billion. NRC attempted to conceal the entire report, but it was made public by U.S. Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA). Markey has remained a vigilant watchdog on risks at Palisades for decades, right up to the present.

19. **Total Quality or Quality Driven**: The implication that quality assurance (QA) or control is in place in the nuclear industry is highly suspect. As but one example, Commonwealth Edison/Exelon QA auditor Oscar Shirani, leading a team representing a dozen utilities, found major QA violations in the design and manufacture of Holtec dry casks used at 33 U.S. reactors. NRC’s Midwest dry cask storage inspector, Dr. Ross Landsman, shared Shirani’s concerns. But an NRC QA inspection on the design documents and manufacturing plant found no problems whatsoever. Shirani also successfully implemented the first Stop Work Order on General Electric Nuclear Engineering for 52 safety design calculation violations, over a decade before 3 GE Mark Is melted down at Fukushima Daiichi, Japan. Shirani’s reward for doing his job was to be harassed and fired by Exelon, and blacklisted forever after by the U.S. nuclear power industry. He received no protection from NRC.

20. **Stakeholder**: This word is sometimes defined “a person or group that has an investment, share, or interest in

something, as a business or industry”; and “a person holding money or property to which two or more persons make rival claims.” NRC’s common usage of the term “stakeholder” serves to lump concerned citizens and local residents, environmental and public interest groups, and the nuclear power industry itself, into a twisted notion of “the public.” But the public interest is very different from the nuclear power industry’s interests, of course. The public is interested in health, safety, and the environment, and the NRC is mandated to protect those interests. However, all too often, NRC serves the nuclear power industry’s interests, in maximizing profits, often at the expense of public health, safety and the environment.

However, another definition of “stakeholder” is “the holder of the stakes of a wager.” In this sense, NRC and Entergy are the “stakeholders,” in the game of radioactive Russian roulette being played at Palisades. Of course, the public’s health and safety, as well as the environment, are what’s at stake.

21. ***Safety culture:*** NRC’s “Safety Culture Policy Statement” defines nuclear “safety culture” as: the core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment. But NRC’s own Office of Inspector General reported in late 2002 that the agency itself had prioritized nuclear utility profits ahead of public safety, leading to the Davis-Besse atomic reactor in Ohio’s “Hole-in-the-Head” lid corrosion fiasco, the closest thing to a major disaster at a U.S. nuclear reactor since Three Mile Island.

Ironically, NRC and Davis-Besse owner FirstEnergy Nuclear are up to their old tricks, 10 years later. NRC has allowed Davis-Besse to operate for the past year, despite the discovery of severe cracking of its concrete containment shell “Shield Building,” risking a catastrophic radioactivity release in the event of a meltdown.

At Palisades, Entergy’s internal 2012 safety culture survey revealed that 74% of the workforce, including management, believed that profits trump safety, and feared raising safety concerns for fear of retaliation and harassment. NRC helped conceal this shocking collapse of “safety culture” from the media and public for months, until Palisades whistleblowers brought it to light through their attorney, Billie Pirner Garde, who turned for help to U.S. Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA). At Millstone Unit 1 in Connecticut in the mid-1990s, a “mere” 10% workforce fear of raising safety issues led to the permanent shutdown of the reactor.

Thus, “safety culture” can be regarded as NRC ear balm for the public and media; NRC supposedly requires it of utilities, yet is clueless about and devoid of it itself.

22. ***Client focus[ed]:*** As is now clear, NRC regards the nuclear power industry as its client, not the public. After all, 90% of NRC’s budget comes from “licensee fees” – that is, from the nuclear power industry itself. NRC knows not to bite the hand that feeds it. Thus, due to the complete capture of NRC by the industry it is supposed to regulate, NRC’s form of “public service” equates to “serving the public up for dinner.”

23. ***Cross-cutting issue:*** As stated by NRC, “If the NRC determines that a substantive cross-cutting issue exists at a given plant, the resultant semiannual performance review assessment letters summarize the specific substantive cross-cutting issue to include the necessary actions to resolve the issue. The next semiannual performance review assessment letter will either state that the issue has been satisfactorily resolved or summarize the agency’s assessment and licensee’s progress in addressing the issue.” However, NRC has rushed restoration of Palisades’ top-notch safety status designation – under pressure by U.S. Rep. Fred Upton, who chairs the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Commission, and thus NRC’s budget – despite many cross-cutting issues of concern.

NRC’s decision to maintain “additional oversight” at Palisades (“by conducting over 1,000 additional hours of inspections at the plant in 2013”), due to numerous leaks and breakdowns in 2012, directly contradicts the agency’s conclusion that “the plant has moved to the performance column which would no longer require increased oversight.” NRC’s talking out both sides of its mouth seems to be an internal agency cross-cutting

issue of tremendous concern to the public.

24. ***Leverage***: The nuclear establishment means “the use of a small initial investment, credit, or borrowed funds to gain a very high return in relation to one's investment, to control a much larger investment, or to reduce one's own liability for any loss.” But a lesser known definition is more apt: “power or ability to act or to influence people, events, decisions, etc.; sway; advantage, strength, weight; clout, pull.”

Entergy uses its leverage to influence the local, county, state, and federal governments. Entergy's twin reactor Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant made \$1.2 million in pre-tax net profits *each day*, a Hudson River newspaper reported several years ago. The millions, or even tens of millions of dollars, paid to local municipalities and the host county, are a relatively small amount of money for Entergy. Entergy's charitable donations are little more than pocket change to the nuclear utility, which is making such a killing (profits) while getting away with murder (safety shortcuts, radioactivity releases, externalizing costs, risks, liabilities onto the public). But all this adds up to Entergy wielding tremendous political, economic, and societal leverage.

25. ***Energy Excursion or Transient***: Meltdown or catastrophic radioactivity release.

26. ***Catch basins***: Term used by Entergy to describe the buckets, pails, or bottles utilized to capture a year-long leak of sometimes more than 30 gallons per day of acidic (corrosive) and tritiated (radioactive) water into the Palisades safety-critical control room, with its vulnerable electrical circuitry, from the 300,000 gallon safety-related Safety Injection Refueling Water storage Tank (SIRWT) unwisely located directly above.

Whistleblowers at Palisades alerted their attorney, Billie Pirner Garde, who alerted U.S. Rep. Ed Markey, who alerted the public. The leak into the control had been kept from the public, the media, and even the NRC's own Chairman, Greg Jaczko, despite him touring Palisades on May 25, 2012 – resulting in ongoing investigations at NRC as to why he was kept in the dark.

27. ***Wildly Important Goals (WIGs)***: An odd phrase used repeatedly by Entergy executives at a Sept. 12, 2012 NRC public meeting in South Haven. Entergy used it to refer to its plans for restoring safety culture at Palisades after the utter collapse revealed by whistleblowers and Rep. Markey in June 2012. Alice Hirt of Don't Waste Michigan in Holland, a long-time watchdog on Palisades, regards Entergy's “WIGs” as a “Wildly Insulting Gimmick.”

28. ***Meltdown and Nukespeak***:

“A Google search for the past month showed more than 1.93 billion hits for ‘meltdown.’ Yet the regulators at the NRC remain wary of listing the word that everyone else in the world uses to summarize the full horror of what will ensue if uranium fuel at the core of a commercial nuclear power plant is left uncooled long enough for it to melt. It's no surprise, since the nuclear industry's proponents speak a different language than the rest of us, a special language where euphemism and obfuscation reign, as we first pointed out thirty years ago in our book *Nukespeak: Nuclear Language, Myths, and Mindset*. Nukespeak is the language of the nuclear mindset — the worldview or system of beliefs of nuclear developers and enthusiasts, to whom there are never any accidents — only ‘events’ or ‘incidents’, ‘abnormal evolutions and normal aberrations’, or ‘plant transients.’” (taken from “No Word for Meltdown: The Return of Nukespeak,” by Rory O'Connor, March 15, 2011, four days after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear catastrophe began)

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