"Utilities balk at safer storage of spent nuclear fuel to avoid 'wasted investment'"

As reported by the Asahi Shimbun, very few Japanese nuclear power plants have on-site dry cask storage for irradiated nuclear fuel. A relatively large amount of INF has already been transported to a storage pool at the targeted Rokkasho reprocessing facility in northern Japan, although its operational opening is nearly two decades behind schedule.

Or, as at Fukushima Daiichi, high-level radioactive (HLRW) waste was moved from individual reactor units into a common pool.

That's why, when the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear catastrophe began on 3/11/11, there was a relatively small amount of HLRW in the Units 1 to 4 storage pools. But even what was there, risked a large-scale radioactivity release that would have dwarfed what has occurred so far, in four years, due to the three melt downs and damaged or destroyed containment structures.

In fact, fear that the Unit 4 pool was devoid of cooling water led to Japanese Self Defense Forces conducting desperate helicopter drops of water from above, in attempt to refill the pool. The fear also played a large part in the U.S. decision to urge American citizens to evacuate 50 miles away from Fukushima Daiichi.

Because pools lack containment, a sudden drain down, or slower motion boil down, of the cooling water supply, and a subsequent INF fire in the pool, could be cataclysmic. Robert Alvarez of IPS estimated that the Unit 4 pool alone at Fukushima Daiichi contained an order of magnitude more hazardous radioactive cesium than was released by the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe.

There are voices, such as Professor Katsuta quoted in this article, advocating on-site dry cask storage in Japan, to address storage pool risks, and as an alternative to dirty, dangerous, and expensive reprocessing. Beyond Nuclear has worked with Dr. Katsuta in both Tokyo and Washington, D.C.

In the U.S., hundreds of environmental groups, representing all 50 states, have called for Hardened On-Site Storage, to address both pool and dry cask storage risks.

"All rice grown in Fukushima pass radiation safety checks for first time"

As reported by the Asahi Shimbun, no Fukushima Prefecture grown rice in 2014, tested for radioactivity, were found to surpass so-called "acceptable" or "permissible" level of radioactive Cesium. That could not be said in 2012 and 2013.

However, despite the phrase "safety standards" used in the article, Japan's standard of 100 becquerels/kg of food does not mean the food is "safe." A cost-benefit analysis has been done, and government decision makers have deemed the health risks of eating the contaminated rice "acceptable." 

For, as the U.S. NAS has affirmed for decades, any exposure to ionizing radioactivity carries a health risk for cancer, and these risks accumulate over a lifetime of exposures.

However, Japan's standard is twelve times stronger than America's, and ten times stronger than Canada's. Canada "allows" 1,000 Bq/kg of radioactive Cesium in food; the U.S. "permits" a whopping 1,200 Bq/kg! This means that radioactively contaminated food grown in Japan considered unfit for domestic consumption could be exported to North American markets.

"TEPCO's sloppy handling of suppressant led to spread of radioactive dust in 2013"

As reported by the Asahi Shimbun, it has been determined that the cause of large-scale radioactivity releases to air at Fukushima Daiichi was due to "sloppy handling" of dust suppressant, and a low priority placed on workers' and local residents' health and safety.

Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) was found to have diluted dust suppressant chemicals in ten to one hundred times too much water, and instead of applying them once per day, sometimes only applied them once per two months.

A dozen workers were thus contaminated with radioactive dust, and fallout extended 3 km (2 mi), during debris removal at the ruins of the Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 reactor in summer 2013.

Previous Asahi Shimbun articles have reported that radioactive dust escaping the debris removal operations fell out over a wide area, even tens of km downwind, contaminating rice crops.

"Fukushima mothers compile booklet derived from radiation seminars"

As reported by the Asahi Shimbun, the Veteran Mothers’ Society of Minami-Soma, working with a medical doctor since Dec. 2011 to educate themselves and others about the hazards of Fukushima Daiichi's radioactive fallout, have prepared booklets in English and Japanese compiling their lessons learned.

"Last recommended evacuation warning lifted in Fukushima, but many remain wary"

As reported by the Asahi Shimbun, the national government of Japan has lifted any remaining evacuation orders from the Fukushima Prefecuture town of Minami-Soma, near the wrecked reactors at Fukushima Daiichi.

The area had been under mandatory evacuation orders, the article reports, because:

"The districts in Minami-Soma were designated as such because they were at risk of exceeding the annual accumulated dose limit of 20 millisieverts, or 3.8 microsieverts per hour."

However, government decision makers had lifted the orders, because:

"Central government officials explained their latest decision to the residents and local officials, saying that the health risks are not expected because radiation levels in their sites now measure well below the designated limit of 20 millisieverts."

20 milliSieverts/year, or 2 Rem/year, is a large dose, however. It is the legal limit for radioactivity exposures to nuclear workers in Germany, for example.

"Health risks are not expected" flies in the face of U.S. NAS findings, affirmed for decades, that any exposure to ionizing radioactivity carries a health risk of cancer, and that these risks accumulate over a lifetime of exposures.

The 2 Rem/year "allowable" standard was an emergency level set in the aftermath of the beginning of the 3/11/11 nuclear catastrophe. Before the triple meltdown, the "allowable" level for members of the public had been 100 millirem/year, but this was increased 20-fold, in order to decrease the size of the evacuation area. The health consequences of this decision will unfold over time, in the lives of area residents never evacuated, or evacuees now being pressured to return to their radioactive homes.