Latest incident at Palisades: Control room not protected against radioactive air inleakage in case of a radiological emergency
August 16, 2013
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The cover of John G. Fuller's 1975 classic "We Almost Lost Detroit" -- about the partial meltdown of the Fermi 1 plutonium breeder reactor on Oct. 5, 1966 -- shows an artist's rendition of a typical respirator and radiation protection suit worn by nuclear workers in radiological contamination zonesAs described in an Event Notification Report posted at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) website, the problem-plagued Palisades atomic reactor in Covert, MI experienced its latest mishap on August 13th:

'BOTH CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION FILTRATION TRAINS DECLARED INOPERABLE

"At approximately 1102 [EDT], August 13, 2013, both control room ventilation filtration trains were declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10, Condition B, due to a control room boundary door not being fully closed. The door was unable to be closed for approximately nine minutes due to an apparent mis-operation of the door operating mechanism. The door's locking bolts fully extended causing interference between the door and door frame. The door was restored to operable status at approximately 1111 [EDT], August 13, 2013.

"Technical Specification 3.7.10 allows control room boundary doors to be opened intermittently, under administrative control for preplanned activities, provided the doors can be rapidly restored to the design condition. Previous evaluations of the door not being fully closed for a limited time concluded no loss of safety function had existed.

"This condition had no impact on the health and safety of the public.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."'

In a radiological emergency situation, however, the condition could well have a direct impact on the health and safety of Palisades control room workers -- which could have indirect, but catastrophic, consequences for the health and safety of the public downwind, downstream, up the food chain, and down the generations.

When Beyond Nuclear's Kevin Kamps queried the Union of Concerned Scientists' Dave Lochbaum regarding the incident, Dave confirmed Kevin's understanding was accurate. Kevin asked if the issue involved the requirement to protect control room workers against radioactivity entering the control room during an emergency at Palisades.

Dave responded:

"That's the concern. The design provides for the control room to be maintained at a slightly higher pressure than neighboring areas and the air outside. This design forces clean air to leak out of the control room rather than potentially contaminated air leaking in. With this design functional, the operators need not wear respirators and clean suits while occupying the control room.

With the door not closed, the ventilation system cannot maintain the control room at a higher pressure. That inability is why both ventilation system trains were declared inoperable."

Lochbaum had previously written to NRC, pointing out that leaks of water into the control room from the ceiling above showed that the control room was also vulnerable to the inleakage of radioactivity in air during an accident.

Depending on the type and concentration/dose rate of the radioactivity entering the control room, Palisades operators could be forced to don radiation suits and respirators, complicating their communications and efforts to address the emergency situation, or could be forced to abandon the control room altogether. Gamma penetrating radiation, like X-rays, for example, would not be stopped by a thin plastic suit.

NIRS has a pamphlet for nuclear industry workers entitled "Your Nuclear Workplace: Know Your Risks, Know Your Rights," which shows a typical radiation protection suit, as well as respiratory protection equipment.

Whistleblowers at Palisades have confided in Kevin over the decades that their managers have instructed them not to wear radiation protection suits and respirators, even in radioactively contaminated areas, as it slows down their work!

Article originally appeared on Beyond Nuclear (https://archive.beyondnuclear.org/).
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