The Alliance for Nuclear           Accountability
 
A national network of           organizations working to address nuclear weapons production           and waste cleanup
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEDIA         ADVISORY:
 
WHAT TO LOOK         FOR IN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S FY 2022 
 
NUCLEAR         WEAPONS AND CLEANUP BUDGET REQUEST
 
May 26, 2021
For use with DOE’s           scheduled budget release on Friday May 28, 2021
For more           information, key contacts are listed below.
 
The White House is releasing its detailed Fiscal Year       2022 budget on Friday, May 28. A so-called “skinny budget” was       released on April 9 that increased Department of Energy (DOE)       funding to $46.1 billion, which reportedly includes major new       investments in clean energy and climate change abatement. That       said, historically roughly 60% of DOE’s funding has been earmarked       for nuclear weapons production and cleanup of Cold War wastes and       contamination. The pending budget release will finally provide       details on those programs.
 
Because the budget release is so late Congress has       already announced that it can’t consider the annual Defense       Authorization Act until September. Related appropriations bills       will no doubt be delayed too. This means that the government will       probably have to run on a Continuing Resolution(s) for much of FY       2022 (which begins October 1, 2021).
 
The Alliance for Nuclear Accountability strongly       opposed the massive 25% FY 2021 increase that the Trump       Administration gave to the National Nuclear Security       Administration’s (NNSA’s) nuclear weapons programs and proposed       cuts to Department of Energy cleanup. In addition, DOE’s nuclear       weapons and environmental management programs have been on the       Government Accountability Office’s “High Risk List” for project       mismanagement and waste of taxpayers’ dollars for 28 consecutive       years. Related, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has just       released a report that projects a 28% increase in costs for       so-called “modernization” of U.S. nuclear forces that between the       Defense Department and DOE is expected to cost around $1.7       trillion over 30 years.
 
The Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, a       34-year-old network of groups from communities downwind and       downstream of U.S. nuclear weapons sites, will be analyzing the       following critical issues. For details, contact the ANA leaders       listed at the end of this Advisory.
 
General Budget         Issues
 
•     Will DOE       and NNSA submit to Congress legally required reports on unspent       balances from previous years? As Congress moves through the       legislative process, will authorizers and appropriators subtract       “Prior Year Balances” from amounts requested by DOE and NNSA in       the FY 2022 budget?
 
•     As       evidenced by the recent CBO report, escalating “modernization”       costs will be a chronic concern. To help meet that concern, will       NNSA include in its FY 2022 budget request legally required four       year cost projections for its major programs?
 
Nuclear         Warheads
 
•     The W87-1       will be the first new warhead with wholly new components. The       Trump Administration projected $691 million for the W87-1 in FY       2022. Will the first Biden budget request constrain this warhead       program? [Note: the W87-1 is slated to top the Air Force’s new       “Ground Based Strategic Deterrent” missile and is the also the       driver for NNSA’s planned expanded production of plutonium “pit”       bomb cores, in all expected to cost more than $140 billion.]
 
•     The W93       is a proposed new submarine-launched warhead whose main advocate       is the United Kingdom, which substantially relies on U.S. warhead       designs and plans to increase its own nuclear weapons stockpile.       The Trump Administration projected $80 million in FY 2022 to       jumpstart this warhead’s development. Will the Biden budget fully       fund this new program? Does the U.S. Navy really want this       new-design warhead when its own existing warheads have already       been tested and are being upgraded?
 
•     Trump’s       2018 Nuclear Posture Review proposed to bring back nuclear-armed       sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), which were retired by       President George H.W. Bush after the end of the Cold War. Will the       FY 2022 Biden budget fund NNSA to conduct warhead design       activities for this Cold War relic? Or will it cancel the program?       Does the U.S. Navy really want the expense of having to certify       attack submarine crews for nuclear-armed SLCMs?
 
•     The B83,       the last U.S. megaton-class nuclear bomb, had been slated for       retirement prior to Trump’s Nuclear Posture Review reversing its       course. Will the Biden FY 2022 budget request include funding to       keep it in the stockpile – or to fund its promised retirement?
 
Nuclear         Weapons Production 
 
•     The Commander of Strategic       Command recently testified to Congress that expanded production of       plutonium “pit” bomb cores is the #1 “modernization” issue. The       Trump Administration increased “Plutonium Modernization” by 70% to       $3.4 billion in FY 2022. Will the Biden Administration keep that       level of funding for FY 2022?
 
•     What portion of that       funding will be for upgrades to the Los Alamos National       Laboratory’s aging plutonium facility so the Lab can produce more       than 30 pits per year? How much will be for fast tracking the new       Plutonium Bomb Plant at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South       Carolina to make 50 or more plutonium pits per year?
 
•     NNSA’s current cost       estimate to “repurpose” the failed MOX plant at SRS (which has       already cost taxpayers $7 billion) to pit production is $4.6       billion. NNSA’s “Critical Decision-1” to proceed with the bomb       plant is expected soon after Biden’s FY 2022 budget release, with       likely escalating costs of $10 billion or more. Will that throw a       major monkey wrench into NNSA’s plans of simultaneous pit       production at both LANL and SRS? What impact will that have on       Congressional authorization and appropriations?
 
•     Is the       rationale for expanded plutonium pit production changing from       being a “hedge” against technical and geopolitical surprise to       replacing all pits in all ~4,000 active and reserve nuclear       weapons over the next 50 years? Why is expanded plutonium pit       production needed to begin with when the U.S. already has more       than 15,000 pits in storage and independent experts have found       that pits last at least a century?
 
 
•     NNSA has       claimed that the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant       near Oak Ridge, TN is on time and will meet its declared budget       cap of $6.5 billion. However, that is after NNSA moved the goal       posts and eliminated non-production missions such as       dismantlements and downblending of highly enriched uranium (which       would save large security and nuclear safety costs). Because of       the UPF’s downscoping, NNSA has decided to continue operating two       old contaminated facilities that can never meet modern safety and       seismic standards. When is NNSA going to own up to exceeding the       UPF budget cap that it promised time and again to Congress?
 
•     Will NNSA’s       budget seek adequate funds to decontaminate and decommission       excess “High Risk Facilities” at Oak Ridge, Livermore and other       nuclear weapons sites, or will officials continue to ignore the       “ever increasing risk” (the DOE Inspector General’s description)       to workers and the public until it’s too late?
 
Cleanup
 
- Will       the budget request comply with the law (National Defense       Authorization Act of FY 2020, Sec. 4409) and include for Fiscal       Years 2022-2026 annual estimates of the costs of meeting legal       cleanup milestones at each DOE site? DOE has never provided such       cost estimates, which would demonstrate that the budget request is       many tens of millions of dollars short of what is required by       legal agreements with host states.
 
 
- Will       DOE include the lifecycle cost estimate to clean up its nuclear       sites? Chronic underfunding of DOE environmental programs leads to       ever-increasing lifecycle cleanup costs — from $341.6 billion in       FY 2016 to $388.2 billion in FY 2018 to $413.9 billion in FY 2019,       to providing no lifecycle costs in FY 2020 and FY 2021.
 
-  Does       the budget again include funding for "Consolidated Interim       Storage" for commercial irradiated fuel (AKA lethal high-level       radioactive wastes)? Previous budgets have included that money       even though DOE funding of private storage sites is prohibited by       federal law and Congress refuses to appropriate the funds.
 
- How       much funding is provided for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)? [Note:       $115 million appropriated in FY 2021.] Such funds are a bailout to       the failing nuclear energy industry since SMRs are not technically       or financially viable.
 
- What funding       will Congress request for the proposed new 2,100 foot deep utility       shaft at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) even though the       shaft project does not yet have permit approval from the State of       New Mexico? In FY 2021 Congress requested $50 million, which       brought total funding of the proposed shaft to $164 million. This       represents 83% of the total estimated cost of the shaft of $197       million for a project, which, if finally approved by the State,       will no doubt bust its budget.
 
•     How much will Congress       request for the American Centrifuge Plant in Portsmouth, Ohio? In       2019, the American Centrifuge Operating, LLC entered into a       contract with the DOE to build centrifuges to demonstrate       production of high-assay, low-enriched uranium (HALEU). Production       is about to be licensed by the NRC and would begin an unneeded new       nuclear program at a site with a history of safety issues. The       technology and use of HALEU also opens the capacity for production       of highly enriched uranium, which would be a dangerous       proliferation risk.
 
- Will       the budget request include funding to begin work on new storage       and staging tanks for high-level tank waste at the Hanford       Reservation in Washington state? DOE wants to reclassify       high-level waste. To close the tank farms where this waste is       stored, DOE wants to reclassify any waste remaining in the Hanford       tanks after treatment and leave the waste in the bottom of the       tanks rather than removing and treating it. New tanks are needed       to replace leaking tanks while DOE makes final decisions on       cleanup.
 
 
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The annual DOE and         NNSA Congressional Budget Requests are typically available on         the scheduled release date by 1:00 pm EST at https://www.energy.gov/cfo/listings/budget-justification-supporting-documents
 
For information about         specific DOE and NNSA nuclear weapons sites and programs,         contact:
 
Los Alamos Lab Pit         Production and Life Extension Programs-
      Jay Coghlan:         505.989.7342 jay@nukewatch.org
Livermore Lab and Life         Extension Programs-
      Marylia Kelley:         925.443.7148 marylia@trivalleycares.org
Uranium Processing         Facility and Dismantlements -
      Ralph Hutchison:         865.776.5050 orep@earthlink.net
Pit Production and MOX         Plant at the Savannah River Site -
      Tom Clements:         803.240.7268 tomclements329@cs.com
Environmental         Management, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and Yucca Mountain –
      Don Hancock:         505.262.1862 sricdon@earthlink.net
The American         Centrifuge Plant in Portsmouth, Ohio
      Vina         Colley, 740 357 8916 vcolley@earthlink.net