Vermont Yankee challenges state shutdown decision with nuclear fuel order

Entergy Nuclear, the New Orleans-based owner and operator of the Vermont Yankee nuclear power station, announced that it is ordering more nuclear fuel for its Vermont Yankee nuclear power station. Entergy plans to refuel the GE Mark I Boiling Water Reactor in October 2011.  The announcement is in defiance of the State of Vermont February 24, 2010 decision not to allow the Fukushima-style reactor to operate beyond March 21, 2012 at the end of its original 40-year license. 

After a 5 year licensing challenge before a federal relicensing board, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission voted to extend the reactor's operating license by another 20 years just days after the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant accident in Japan on March 11, 2012.  

The Entergy announcement was not a surprise to many engaged in the legal challenge that goes to trial on September 12, 2011 as well as a citizen mobilization gearing up for mass nonviolent direct action to oppose the continued operations.

Despite Fukushima demonstration, NRC task force ignores warning on dangerous Mark I reactors

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) “Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident” publicly released its 92-page well intentioned near-term review on the implications of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster for US reactors on July 13, 2011.  The federal agency proposes to improve its “patchwork of regulatory requirements” developed “piece by piece over the decades.” Beyond Nuclear remains concerned that many critical reactor safety areas are still dominated by industry “voluntary initiatives” where non-compliance continues to elude federal enforcement and  Capitol Hill pro-nuclear champions announced their resistance to any costly safety improvements.

Of most concern, the NRC is still ignoring warnings as did its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission,  in 1972 from their senior safety officer, Dr. Steven Hanuaer to “discourage all further use” in the US of the Fukushima-style General Electric Mark I boiling water reactor. The federal regulators instead issued three more construction permits and eventually 16 more operating licenses in the 1970s for this same dangerous design. There are now 23 Fukushima-style reactors operating in the United States as part of a total of 32 Mark I’s worldwide---counting the smoldering radioactive rubble at Fukushima.   The NRC task force report does not fundamentally address the most critical issue coming out of the Fukushima catastrophe, namely, the design vulnerability of all Mark I containment structures to catastrophic failure during a severe accident.

The NRC report further ignores that these same Mark I reactors, like Vermont Yankee and Oyster Creek, are not currently in compliance with their operating licenses that were originally required to have a reliable "leak tight" containment structure. If the NRC were looking for the most significant and meaningful safety upgrade to the US reactors directly impacted by the Fukushima disaster they would require that all Mark I reactor operators restore containment integrity to the original licensed leak tight condition. Or order that they be shut them down, permanently.  All of the Mark I reactors voluntarily installed retrofits to vent all a substandard and undersized containment to save it from rupturing during a severe accident. The same experimental vent was installed at Fukushima in 1991. The same experimental fix failed on three containments buildings to prevent the uncontrolled releases of radioactivity to the air and water that are still occurring now four months after the accident.

Instead, in order to keep these dangerous reactors operational, many now with twenty year license extensions, the NRC task force is recommending that rather than the industry volunteering a dubious containment vent system, the NRC should order the nuclear industry to take another try at an experimental venting fix which fundamentally compromises their own defense in depth philosophy.

It is even more telling that the NRC report’s preamble “recognizes that there likely will be more than 100 nuclear power plants operating throughout the United States for decades to come.” By contrast, the same day that the NRC  publicly released its report in the USA, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan announced that the implications of Fukushima for nuclear power in Japan meant that “’We will aim to bring about a society that can exist without nuclear power,’ he said.” Perhaps, now too late for a society to live without the threat of increasing radioactivity levels.

Did earthquake begin meltdown at Fukushima Daiichi even before tsunami struck?

The Atlantic Wire, in an article entitled "Meltdown: What Really Happened at Fukushima?" by Jake Adelstein and David McNeill, reports -- based on interviews with eyewitnesses, as well as a careful review of the catastrophe's timeline and even documented admissions made by Tokyo Electric Power Company itself -- that major damage to piping and other safety significant structures at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 -- the oldest reactor at the site -- may very well have begun the first meltdown, even before the tsunami hit. The article reports:

"The reason for official reluctance to admit that the earthquake did direct structural damage to reactor one is obvious. Katsunobu Onda, author of TEPCO: The Dark Empire, who sounded the alarm about the firm in his 2007 book explains it this way: 'If TEPCO and the government of Japan admit an earthquake can do direct damage to the reactor, this raises suspicions about the safety of every reactor they run. They are using a number of antiquated reactors that have the same systematic problems, the same wear and tear on the piping.' "

The article adds:

"On May 15, TEPCO went some way toward admitting at least some of these claims in a report called 'Reactor Core Status of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit One.' The report said there might have been pre-tsunami damage to key facilities including pipes. 'This means that assurances from the industry in Japan and overseas that the reactors were robust is now blown apart,' said Shaun Burnie, an independent nuclear waste consultant. 'It raises fundamental questions on all reactors in high seismic risk areas.' "

Tsunamis are even more rare than already rare earthquakes. Thus, tsunami risks -- including to U.S. reactors -- can more easily be portrayed by the nuclear establishment in industry and government as exceedingly improbable -- even though a radioactively catastrophic one has just happened in Japan. Not only Tepco and the Japanese federal government were quick to obscure earthquake damage at Fukushima Daiichi, focusing attention on the tsunami's impact instead. Exelon Nuclear's CEO, John Rowe, who "serves" on President Obama's and Energy Secretary Chu's "Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future," was quick to downplay the earthquake's impact at Fukushima, instead highlighting the tsunami. An Exelon statement dated March 14th began:

"Exelon is closely monitoring the situation in Japan as it continues to unfold. While there is still a great deal we don’t know, from all information the company received so far, it appears that the damage to the Japanese plants was primarily related to the tsunami, not the earthquake."

A common "red herring" refrain of the U.S. nuclear industry since March 11th is that tsunamis are impossible at the many inland reactors across the U.S., while largely or entirely ignoring earthquake risks themselves, as well as other pathways (tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, fires, power outages, mechanical failure, human error, intentional attack, etc.) that could plunge reactors into station blackout, followed within hours by core meltdown and days by high-level radioactive waste storage pool fires.