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Centralized Storage

With the scientifically unsound proposed Yucca Mountain radioactive waste dump now canceled, the danger of "interim" storage threatens. This means that radioactive waste could be "temporarily" parked in open air lots, vulnerable to accident and attack, while a new repository site is sought.

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Entries by admin (702)

Tuesday
Oct062020

Beyond Nuclear's 5th set of public comments, on NRC's ISP/WCS CISF DEIS, re: Docket ID NRC-2016-0231, and report number NUREG-2239 -- re: complexity and risk of multiple required cask-to-cask canister transfers

Submitted via: <WCS_CISF_EIS@nrc.gov>

 

Dear NRC Staff,

We submit these comments on behalf of our members and supporters, not only in New Mexico and Texas, near the targeted ISP/WCS CISF site, but across both of these states, and the rest of the country, along road, rail, and waterway routes that would be used for high risk, highly radioactive waste shipments to ISP's CISF, as well as to Yucca Mountain, Nevada, on Western Shoshone land -- wrongly and illegally assumed by ISP/WCS, as well as by NRC, to someday become a permanent disposal repository.

The following subject matter has gotten little to no attention in NRC's ISP/WCS CISF DEIS, a far cry from NEPA's legally binding "hard look" requirement: the complexity and risk of multiple required cask-to-cask canister transfers.

The inner canisters will have to be transferred (from on-site storage dry casks, to radiation shielding/transfer casks, to transport/shipping casks, again to transfer casks, then to CISF storage casks at ISP/WCS, TX; and then, if and when high-level radioactive wastes are exported to a permanent repository, the reverse process) multiple times. Nowhere in the NRC DEIS is this complexity, and high risk for something to go wrong, reflected, admitted, nor analyzed adequately.

Making matters worse, NRC is not even requiring Dry Transfer Systems (DTS), neither at the nuclear power plant origin sites, nor at ISP/WCS's CISF, nor anywhere in between. So there will be no way to deal with failed fuel or containers, as well as leaks or contamination, if and when they occur.

Expert witness Bob Alvarez, serving ISP/WCS CISF opponents, a former senior advisor to the U.S. Energy Secretary, has testified in these very CISF ASLB licensing proceedings that under DOE's latest Yucca dump plans, targeting Western Shoshone land in NV, high-level radioactive wastes can only be buried in TADs -- standardized Transport, Aging, and Disposal containers specially designed for use at the Yucca dump. This would require dividing up the contents of several thousand larger-sized containers at ISP/WCS's CISF into many tens of thousands of smaller-sized TADs. Nowhere is this addressed in the ISP/WCS ER, nor the NRC DEIS. And yet both ISP/WCS and NRC assume Yucca will be the ultimate dump, itself an outrage, as Ian Zabarte, Principal Man of the Western Bands of the Shoshone Indians, and secretary of the Native Community Action Council, testified on the NRC's June 23, 2020 webinar/call-in public comment meeting re: Holtec's CISF DEIS. (As we have commented previously in this proceeding, the Holtec/ELEA CISF in NM, and the ISP/WCS CISF in TX, share many overlaps. They are but 40 miles apart, across the NM/TX state line. Even Holtec CEO Krishna Signh has said the two CISFs are not competitors, rather, they complement each other. Thus, Ian Zabarte's testimony in the Holtec DEIS proceeding is equally valid here.) Ian Zabarte made clear the Western Shoshone hold title to Yucca Mountain, as acknowledged by the U.S. government when it signed the "peace and friendship" Treaty of Ruby Valley in 1863.

That ISP/WCS CISF containers to TAD containers repackaging process described above will have significant risks and potential impacts for health, environment, and safety, and yet could not be done without a DTS. The entire complex, high risk subject matter area is missing from NRC's ISP/WCS CISF DEIS, another violation of NEPA's "hard look" requirement, and even a violation of the Atomic Energy Act, given the inherent, large safety risks.

Please address your woefully inadequate "hard look" under NEPA, re: this health-, safety-, and environmentally-significant subject matter above.

And please acknowledge your receipt of these comments, and confirm their inclusion as official public comments in the record of this docket.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Kay Drey, President, Board of Directors, Beyond Nuclear

and

Kevin Kamps, Radioactive Waste Specialist, Beyond Nuclear

Tuesday
Oct062020

Beyond Nuclear's 4th set of public comments, on NRC's ISP/WCS CISF DEIS, re: Docket ID NRC-2016-0231, and report number NUREG-2239 -- large impacts/risks of high-level radioactive waste transportation, lack of shipment route maps

Submitted via <WCS_CISF_EIS@nrc.gov>

Dear NRC Staff,

We submit these comments on behalf of our members and supporters, not only in New Mexico and Texas, near the targeted ISP/WCS CISF site, but across both of these states, and the rest of the country, along road, rail, and waterway routes that would be used for high risk, highly radioactive waste shipments to ISP's CISF, as well as to Yucca Mountain, Nevada, on Western Shoshone land -- wrongly and illegally assumed by ISP/WCS, as well as by NRC, to someday become a permanent disposal repository.

The following subject matter has gotten little to no attention in NRC's ISP/WCS CISF DEIS, a far cry from NEPA's legally binding "hard look" requirement: the large impacts, and high risks, of high-level radioactive waste (irradiated nuclear fuel) transportation. One of NRC's greatest failings is the lack of shipment route maps.

On behalf of our members and supporters in New Mexico and Texas, and beyond throughout the Lower 48 states along transport routes (road, rail, and/or waterway) that would be used to haul irradiated nuclear fuel and other highly radioactive waste (such as Greater-Than-Class-C so-called "low" level radioactive waste to the ISP/WCS CISF in Texas), we protest NRC's woefully inadequate, to nearly non-existent, treatment of highly radioactive waste transport risks central to the proposed scheme, as well as the secrecy surrounding transport routes.

This violates the long-established legal requirement under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) that NRC take a "hard look" at the ISP/WCS CISF proposal, including its inextricably linked high-risk transportation component, impacting most states in the Lower 48.

NRC cites a 2008 Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement on the proposed Yucca Mountain, NV dump targeting Western Shoshone Indian land. NRC cites the 2008 DOE document as part of its excuse for not having to do an ISP/WCS-specific transport analysis in 2020 in its own DEIS for the proposed CISF.

In 2017, Fred Dilger, utilizing that same 2008 DOE document, on behalf of the State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects, published a set of route maps, showing road and rail routes admitted by DOE as the most likely to be used to haul highly radioactive wastes to Yucca Mountain, NV.

Dilger's route maps are posted online under the year 2017, here:

http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/trans.htm

It should be noted that the further away from the American Southwest such shipments originate, the more similar or even identical the routes for hauling highly radioactive wastes, whether bound for NV or TX -- or NM, for that matter. After all, the proposed TX and NM CISF sites are but 40 miles apart, across the state line.

To round out the complete picture, DOE also published barge route maps in its Feb. 2002 Final EIS on Yucca. Beyond Nuclear has posted these barge route maps for potential barge shipments into ports on bays, rivers, harbors, lakes, and seacoasts across the country, at the following online link:

http://archive.beyondnuclear.org/waste-transportation/2017/6/29/potential-barge-routes-on-us-surface-waters-to-ship-high-lev.html

For its part, ISP/WCS's Environment Report accounts for routes to NM from only four of our country's total of 131 atomic reactors (95 still operating, 2 under construction, 34 permanently shutdown) -- three at San Onofre, CA and one at Maine Yankee -- but NRC's DEIS didn't even include this sole, inadequate map! Specifically, Figure 4.2-3, Transportation Routes, Page 4-65, Chapter 4, WASTE CONTROL SPECIALISTS LLC, ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, Revision 0.

Compare ISP/WCS's sole map, to this more comprehensive map, produced by the State of NV re: the Yucca dump targeting Western Shoshone land, based on the same 2008 DOE Final Supplemental EIS that NRC cites in its 2020 ISP/WCS CISF DEIS: http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news2017/ymroutes17.png ).

NRC's DEIS, and ISP/WCS's ER, essentially exclude the high risks of transport, and are not even being transparent about transport routes. This represents segmentation (the dividing up of a major federal action into smaller parts, so that the proposal doesn't seem so significant or impactful after all). This is a violation of NEPA, as long ruled so by the federal courts.

Please address your woefully inadequate "hard look" under NEPA, re: this health-, safety-, and environmentally-significant subject matter above.

And please acknowledge your receipt of these comments, and confirm their inclusion as official public comments in the record of this docket.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Kay Drey, President, Board of Directors, Beyond Nuclear

and

Kevin Kamps, Radioactive Waste Specialist, Beyond Nuclear

Tuesday
Oct062020

Beyond Nuclear's 3rd set of public comments on NRC's ISP/WCS CISF DEIS, re: Docket ID NRC-2016-0231, and report number NUREG-2239 -- 40-year timeframe is an inappropriately, arbitrarily, and capriciously short scope

Submitted via <WCS_CISF_EIS@nrc.gov>

 

Dear NRC Staff,
 
We submit these comments on behalf of our members and supporters, not only in New Mexico and Texas, near the targeted ISP/WCS CISF site, but across both of these states, and the rest of the country, along road, rail, and waterway routes that would be used for high risk, highly radioactive waste shipments to ISP's CISF, as well as to Yucca Mountain, Nevada, on Western Shoshone land -- wrongly and illegally assumed by ISP/WCS, as well as by NRC, to someday become a permanent disposal repository.

The following subject matter has gotten little to no attention in NRC's ISP/WCS CISF DEIS, a far cry from NEPA's legally binding "hard look" requirement: the 40-year timeframe is an inappropriately, arbitrarily, and capriciously short scope. 

NRC's time-limited focus on just 40 years of "temporary" or "interim storage" is inappropriately, arbitrarily and capriciously short, especially given ISP/WCS's own admission in its license application to NRC that "interim storage" could persist for 120 years; in response to a Request for Information from DOE (the U.S. Department of Energy), Holtec (ISP/WCS's complement, not competitor, in the words of Holtec CEO Krishna Singh, at Holtec's Capitol Hill press conference in April 2017, announcing its CISF license application; the two CISFs would be just 40 miles apart) admitted a CISF could operate for 300 years; and in NRC's own 2014 Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel Rule and Generic EIS, the agency acknowledged away-from-reactor ISFSIs (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations) could go on indefinitely (that is, "forevermore," à la the classic book by that title: Forevermore: Nuclear Waste in America, by Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, 1986).

Institutional control could well be lost over such long time periods. Failed containers could release catastrophic amounts of hazardous radioactivity directly into the surface environment, to blow downwind, flow downstream, bioconcentrate up the food chain, and harm people down the generations. This would of course be a LARGE impact (even an EXTRA LARGE impact, as a representative from the Nuclear Issues Study Group in Albuquerque, NM, put it at the June 23, 2020 public comment webinar/call-in session re: Holtec's CISF DEIS), that should be acknowledged in this ISP/WCS CISF DEIS.

NRC Chairwoman Allison Macfarlane attached a note to her vote on the Continued Storage Rule and GEIS, warning that loss of institutional control will remain an ongoing risk. How true. The risk will only increase over time.

This is made all the worse by the bait and switch the NRC has pulled on the American people, yet again. In its Continued Storage Rule and GEIS, NRC expressed "nuclear waste confidence" (the previous name for the Continued Storage Rule was, after all, the Nuclear Waste Confidence Rule), whether long-term storage took place on-site at reactors, or away-from-reactor, as at a Consolidated Interim Storage Facility such as Holtec/ELEA's in NM, and/or ISP/WCS's in TX. (NRC changed the name, from Nuclear Waste Confidence, to Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, after critics dubbed it a Nuclear Waste Confidence Game, or Con Game.)

But NRC's nuclear waste confidence was based on such things as the assumption of the presence of Dry Transfer Systems (DTS), needed in order to safely repackage failing or failed containers, while also protecting worker and public health, and the environment. But NRC has not required a DTS at either the Holtec/ELEA CISF in NM, nor at the ISP/WCS CISF in TX. Holtec, ISP, and NRC have all indicated such a DTS could be built and operated later, as needed, perhaps many decades into the future, post CISF-opening.

Of course, this does not account for the need for a DTS in real time, in an emergency. A DTS would very likely take a long period of time to build, at huge expense. This could not be done in a hurry. But a high-level radioactive waste emergency could unfold in a hurry, such as a leaking, damaged, or otherwise failing or failed container showing up at either the Holtec/ELEA CISF in NM, and/or the ISP/WCS CISF in TX.

Holtec and ISP have both responded with a "Start Clean/Stay Clean" policy, that problematic containers will simply be "Returned to Sender." This is patently absurd, in the case of leaking, contaminated, damaged, or otherwise failed or failing containers. Depending on the route of the "Return to Sender" shipment, literally millions of Americans could be put at risk, in multiple states, during the second leg of the nonsensical, and now even more highly dangerous, round-trip. Such a dangerous shipment could easily violate not only NRC regulations, but multiple federal laws.

If the problem shipment happened to have come from Fermi 2 in MI, that would be a 3,000 mile round-trip. If the problem shipment happened to come from Maine Yankee, that would be a 2,300-mile one-way trip, so a 4,600-mile round-trip. (The two CISFs -- Holtec in NM, ISP in TX -- are only 40 miles apart. In a national sense, whether the shipment from the east were bound for the Holtec, or the ISP, CISF, would make very little difference in terms of overall shipping miles. Holtec would be but 40 miles further west is all. And it must be remembered that every single shipment bound for the ISP/WCS CISF would have to pass through NM to get there. Through Eunice, NM, to be precise. After all, as NRC's ISP DEIS reports, the CISF would be but 0.37 miles away from the NM state line.)

Of course, such a problem container could arrive as soon as the Holtec/ELEA CISF, or the ISP/WCS CISF, were to open, and at any time after that. Without an operating DTS, the Holtec/ELEA CISF and the ISP/WCS CISF, would be caught flat-footed, if and when a problem cask were to arrive.

Of course, problems can, and likely will, develop with containers, even if they first arrive at the CISFs in good shape; age-related degradation over long enough periods of time is guaranteed on Planet Earth, subject as it is to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Things fall apart. Entropy wins in the end. Rust never sleeps. Nor other forms of corrosion and degradation, afflicting all aspects of the CISF, from metal to concrete and everything in between.

If a DTS is never built at the Holtec/ELEA CISF, nor at the ISP/WCS CISF, then catastrophic releases of hazardous radioactivity into the environment are guaranteed, over a long enough time period, due to container failure, combined with inevitable loss of institutional control, as mentioned above. Absent a DTS, NRC's Continued Storage Rule, or Nuclear Waste Confidence, is a nuclear waste con game, perpetrated on the American people. Absence of a DTS just means that loss of institutional control is guaranteed to arrive all that much sooner at the Holtec/ELEA CISF, and at the ISP/WCS CISF.

The 40-year time horizons in NRC's Holtec/ELEA CISF DEIS, and in NRC's ISP/WCS CISF DEIS, are thus inappropriately, arbitrarily, and capriciously short.

Please address your woefully inadequate "hard look" under NEPA, re: this health-, safety-, and environmentally-significant subject matter above.

And please acknowledge your receipt of these comments.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Kay Drey, President, Board of Directors, Beyond Nuclear

and

Kevin Kamps, Radioactive Waste Specialist, Beyond Nuclear

Monday
Oct052020

Beyond Nuclear's 2nd set of public comments, re: Docket ID NRC-2016-0231, and report number NUREG-2239, NRC's ISP/WCS CISF DEIS -- Risks of “Routine” or “Incident-Free” Shipments Nonetheless Being Like “Mobile X-ray Machines That Can’t Be Turned Off,” and Risks of Externally Contaminated Shipments

Submitted via: <WCS_CISF_EIS@nrc.gov>
Dear NRC Staff,

This is my 2nd set of public comments in this proceeding. My 1st set was submitted verbally during the call-in session on October 1, 2020.

I submit these comments on behalf of our members and supporters, not only in New Mexico and Texas, near the targeted ISP/WCS CISF site, but across both of these states, and the rest of the country, along road, rail, and waterway routes that would be used for high risk, highly radioactive waste shipments to ISP's CISF, as well as to Yucca Mountain, Nevada, on Western Shoshone land -- wrongly and illegally assumed by ISP/WCS, as well as by NRC, to someday become a permanent disposal repository.

The following subject matter has gotten little to no attention in NRC's ISP/WCS CISF DEIS, a far cry from NEPA's legally binding "hard look" requirement.

Risks of  “Routine” or “Incident-Free” Shipments Nonetheless Being Like “Mobile X-ray Machines That Can’t Be Turned Off,” and Risks of Externally Contaminated Shipments

Even “routine” or “incident-free” shipments of irradiated nuclear fuel carry health risks to workers and innocent passers by. This is because it would take so much radiation shielding to completely hold in the gamma and neutron radiation, being emitted by the highly radioactive waste, that the shipments would be too heavy to move economically. So NRC has compromised, and “allows” for or “permits” a certain amount of hazardous gamma and neutron radiation to stream out of the shipping container.

NRC’s regulations allow for up to 10 millirem per hour (mR/hr) of gamma and/or neutron radiation to be emitted, about six feet (two meters, 6.6 feet) away from a shipping cask’s exterior surface. That’s about one to two chest X-rays worth of gamma and neutron radiation, per hour of exposure.

Since the radiation dissipates with the square root of the distance, this means that NRC’s regulations “allow” for up to 200 mR/hr, at the surface of the cask’s exterior. That’s 20 to 40 chest X-rays worth of gamma and neutron radiation, per hour, which NRC “allows” to stream out, right at the cask’s surface.

(Actually, over the years and decades, even the harmful impacts of medical X-rays have been better appreciated and acknowledged, and actions have been taken to mitigate that health damage. That is, the dosage involved in medical X-rays has been decreased, in order to limit the harm done. 5 to 10 mR for a single chest X-ray may have been the norm, decades ago, but medical professionals today try to perform X-rays of lesser dosage than that, in order to limit any unnecessary harm done to the patient's health. Thus, the ballpark figures given above, of 1 to 2 chest X-rays worth of gamma and/or neutron radiation at 6.6 feet, and 20 to 40 chest X-rays worth of gamma and neutron radiation, at the container's exterior surface, actually understate the risk. Compared to today's chest X-rays, the comparison would be even worse.)

NRC has done a cost-benefit analysis – the cost, to human health; the benefit, to the nuclear power industry’s bottom line – and deemed these exposure levels “acceptable” or “permissible.” (“Permissible” or “acceptable” should never be confused with “safe” or “harmless” – exposures to 200 mR/hr, or even 10 mR/hr, still carry health risks. After all, any level of exposure to hazardous ionizing radiation, no matter how small the dose, has long been confirmed to cause cancer, and other maladies. For more information, see: <https://web.archive.org/web/20160325141005/http://www.nirs.org/press/06-30-2005/1>, a Nuclear Information and Resource Service press release about the 2005 National Academy of Science Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation report.)

The humans actually harmed by these exposures to hazardous radioactivity – related to the industry’s NRC-approved, unnecessary shipments to CISFs, for example – might beg to differ! But of course, any negative health impacts associated with irradiated nuclear fuel shipments will not be closely tracked (or tracked at all) by NRC, or any other government agency for that matter. NRC and industry almost always downplay the health risks, and would almost certainly deny any connection between such exposures and negative health outcomes.

Six feet away could affect a person standing beside a train track, as the train goes by. Some real world examples of this situation include the Takoma Metro Station near Takoma Park, Maryland – the Red Line Metro Station platform is right beside the CSX railway, which is targeted for trains to haul irradiated nuclear fuel from the Calvert Cliffs, MD and North Anna, VA nuclear power plants, such as bound for Holtec/ELEA's proposed CISF in NM, as well as ISP/WCS's proposed CISF in TX.

(As Jack Edlow of Edlow International challenged the veracity of my claim re: Calvert Cliffs and North Anna irradiated nuclear fuel shipments passing through Takoma Metro Station en route to proposed dumps out West, please see Page 20 of 20 on the PDF Counter in this document:

<http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news2017/pdf/Cities_Affected.pdf>

The map shows a rail route for hauling irradiated nuclear fuel through metro Washington, D.C., including Takoma Metro Station -- just shy of Silver Spring, Maryland -- bound for the Yucca Mountain, Nevada dump. This is a State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Project's map, based on the U.S. Department of Energy's Final Supplemental EIS for the Yucca dump, published in 2008. Significantly, NRC itself cites this 2008 DOE Yucca FSEIS in its 2020 ISP/WCS CISF DEIS.

It must be pointed out that as far east as metro Washington, D.C., the routing would be identical, whether shipments were bound for Holtec's CISF in NM, ISP's CISF in TX, or the Yucca Mountain, NV dump, on Western Shoshone land.

I have also attached a copy of this map, in PDF format, to this email.

Please note that the route passing through Takoma Metro Station, coming from Virginia to the southwest, would haul North Anna nuclear power plant irradiated nuclear fuel. This is clearly shown on Page 41 of 45 on the PDF Counter, in this document:

<http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news2017/pdf/States_Affected.pdf>

I have also attached this State of Virginia route map, in PDF format, to this email.

Similarly, please note that the route passing through Takoma Metro Station, coming from Maryland to the east, would haul Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant irradiated nuclear fuel. This is clearly shown on Page 19 of 45 on the PDF Counter, in this same document:

<http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news2017/pdf/States_Affected.pdf>

I have also attached this State of Maryland route map, in PDF format, to this email.

It is disconcerting that Edlow International could well be hired by ISP to be involved in the hauling of irradiated nuclear fuel to the WCS, TX CISF, and yet its CEO and President, Jack Edlow, would publicly state false information regarding routing on the NRC's call-in session on October 1, 2020. The falsehood of Jack Edlow's statement is shown by the documentation cited above.

The State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Project's route map documents, as well as its methodology, is posted online at the following link, under the year 2017:

<http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/trans.htm>.)

Although further than six feet away, residences located immediately adjacent to these same CSX rail lines in Tacoma, D.C. mean that those living there could well be exposed to gamma and neutron radiation, although at a lower dose rate (again, the dose rate decreases inversely with the square root of the distance). However, residents can be expected to be present in their homes a lot more often than commuters standing on a Metro platform – including during sleep hours, when trains carrying irradiated nuclear fuel could still go by. And of course, residents along these tracks, could also be commuters standing on the platform, leading to multiple exposures in their daily (and nightly) lives, for years or even decades on end, during an ISP CISF shipping campaign.

Trains pausing next to commuter platforms or residences will prolong and exacerbate these hazardous and potentially injurious exposures. Paused trains – even ones carrying hazardous cargoes like highly radioactive waste – are commonplace in the U.S. Pauses can sometimes last a long time.

Lead automobiles (the ones nearest the tracks) stuck by paused trains at railroad crossings could mean the occupants of those vehicles are exposed to prolonged doses of intense gamma and neutron radiation at such a close range distance. Even a rolling train car would emit a certain dose as it passed by, to lead car occupants stopped nearest the tracks.

Similar situations will arise across the U.S. Innocent passers by, whose daily lives bring them in close proximity to railways, waterways (barges), or roadways (heavy-haul trucks, and also Legal Weight Trucks on interstates or smaller roadways, if ISP chooses to use LWTs) that would be used to ship irradiated nuclear fuel, mean that ordinary people would be exposed to hazardous gamma and neutron radiation in some amount greater than zero – perhaps repeatedly, over the course of years, or even decades, during a ISP CISF shipping campaign.

It has been known since the 1950s, thanks to the good work of epidemiologist Alice Stewart and her team, that a single X-ray to the fetus in the mother's womb significantly increases the baby's risk of contracting cancer in the future. Thus, these Mobile X-ray Machines That Can't Be Turned Off would represent a significant risk to such vulnerable persons as a pregnant woman, and the fetus in her womb.

The 200 mR/hr “acceptable” dose rate at the surface of shipping casks would most likely impact workers – locomotive engineers, railway workers, inspectors, security guards, police, firefighters, emergency responders, etc.

However, when, in 2003, the Big Rock Point reactor pressure vessel (albeit so-called “low” level radioactive waste, it still serves as a cautionary tale) was shipped by heavy-haul truck into Gaylord, Michigan to be loaded onto a train, for its shipment by rail to Barnwell, South Carolina, to be buried in a leaking ditch, neither the nuclear utility, Consumers Power, nor the NRC (nor any other federal or state agency), nor local law enforcement, created a security or safety or health perimeter around the shipping container. As if it were a parade, onlookers were allowed to simply approach the shipping container, walk right up to it, and even touch it. In fact, a parade would probably have had better health, safety, and security precautions in place! (See 2003 written entries, as well as a photo, about this and other troubling incidents that occurred during this single shipment, posted online at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20151211005008/http://www.nirs.org/radwaste/hlwtransport/mobilechernobyl.htm>). ISP's CISF would involve up to several thousands of in-bound irradiated nuclear fuel shipments into the TX de facto permanent, surface storage, parking lot dump; and at least an equal number out, if the waste ever were to leave. (ISP and NRC both erroneously simply assume Yucca Mountain, Nevada -- Western Shoshone land, by treaty right -- will be the permanent burial site.)

However, as expert witness Bob Alvarez has testified on behalf of CISF opponents in the NRC ASLB's ISP proceeding, the several thousands of storage canisters could be subdivided into as many as tens of thousands of smaller diameter TADs (Transport, Aging, and Disposal canisters), for the out-bound shipment from the ISP CISF in TX, to the falsely assumed dump-site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. This would mean many tens of thousands of TAD canister shipments, each one "allowed" or "permitted" to emit 10mR/hr at a distance of 6.6 feet away, or up to 200 mR/hr at the canister overpack's surface.

Likewise, Bob Halstead, several years ago, was able to guide a camera crew deep into the heart of a rail yard, just off downtown Chicago, IL, that would be used to temporarily store (albeit, “temporarily” could last for days) train cars holding irradiated nuclear fuel. Security was nowhere to be seen. (Halstead, then long serving as transport consultant to the State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects, later long served as the agency’s director, the position from which he recently retired.) What this also showed was, even unsuspecting "trespassers" -- such as youth exploring the railyard, or taking a shortcut -- could also be exposed to higher doses of ionizing radioactivity, if they were to encounter an irradiated nuclear fuel shipping cask. Graffiti often seen on the sides of freight rail cars shows that persons have had total access to those cars, for prolonged periods of time.

Similarly, Rick Hind of Greenpeace U.S.A. guided a Wall Street Journal reporter deep into the heart of underground train tunnels under Washington, D.C. The graffiti and art on the walls showed clearly that the tunnels are frequented by human beings. (Hind was showing the reporter how insecure such tunnels, even in the nation’s capital, are to potential security risks, even as hazardous train cargoes – including chlorine shipments, and perhaps someday soon, irradiated nuclear fuel – pass by.)

In these ways, that 200 mR/hr “permissible” dose rate could impact not only workers, but even members of the public -- such as graffiti artists in Washington, D.C.'s train tunnels, or in rail yards across the country!

In this sense, even “routine” or “incident-free” shipments of irradiated nuclear fuel can be considered as similar to mobile X-ray machines that can’t be turned off, a phrase describing the concept first expressed by Lauren Olson, a supporter of NIRS (Nuclear Information and Resource Service).

To make matters worse, there have been large numbers of shipments, externally contaminated with radioactivity, making their actual dose rates much higher – and thus more hazardous – in serious violation of the already compromised “permissible” or “acceptable” levels.

Areva – now renamed Orano, and a major partner in the ISP CISF proposal targeted at WCS, TX – at its home base in France, experienced just such a plague or epidemic of externally contaminated shipments. A full 25% to 33% of Areva’s irradiated nuclear fuel shipments, into its La Hague reprocessing facility, were externally contaminated, for years on end, above “permissible” levels. This amounted to many hundreds of individual shipments, contaminated above “permissible” levels, over the course of several years. On average, the shipments were giving off radiation dose rates 500 times the “permissible” level; in one instance, a shipment was emitting radiation 3,300 times the “acceptable” level.

Environmental watchdogs and journalists revealed this contaminated shipment scandal. See the WISE-Paris write up, Transport Special - Plutonium Investigation n°6/7, posted at http://www.wise-paris.org/ under Bulletins.

But such externally contaminated shipments have happened in the U.S., as well. Halstead documented this in a report prepared for the Nevada State Agency for Nuclear Projects in 1996. It is entitled “Reported Incidents Involving Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipments, 1949 to Present.” 49 “surface contamination” incidents are documented. This report is posted online at: http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/trans/nucinc01.htm. Please see the full text of that report at the hyperlink provided.

It must be pointed out that, per the transport route map provided by ISP in its Environmental Report (ER; Figure 4.2-3, Transportation Routes, on Page 4-65 in the Revision 0 of the ER), not only would long stretches of Oklahoma and Texas be exposed to incoming shipments of irradiated nuclear fuel from eastern nuclear power plants (the one on the map accounted for is Maine Yankee, depicted by the blue line, "Maine Yankee to WCS") but scores of nuclear power plants to the east are not accounted for on the map), but those very same communities would then be exposed to outgoing shipments (depicted by the light green line, "WCS to Yucca Mountain," including not only those that originated at eastern reactors, but also irradiated nuclear fuel from western reactors, such as the route depicted in red, "San Onofre to Yucca Mountain," as but one example). The overlap of incoming eastern shipments (blue line, "Maine Yankee to WCS"), with outbound to Yucca Mountain, Nevada shipments (light green line, "WCS to Yucca Mountain"), are depicted by a dark green line on the figure in the ER. The long stretches of Texas and Oklahoma, depicted along that dark green colored route, show the communities that would be hit, both coming and going, by ISP's transport schemes. And a part of that LARGE impact would be to people's health, due to the gamma and neutron radiation emissions of shipments, even during "incident-free" or "routine" shipments. I have attached a PDF of this figure to this email.
That "double whammy," suffered by Texans and Oklahomans who live in communities along both the "Maine Yankee to WCS," as well as the "WCS to Yucca Mountain," transport routes, shows the nonsensical nature of CISFs, doubling transport risks for certain communities, such as these, for no good reason whatsoever.
It should also be noted that Figure 4.2-3 accounts for merely 4 atomic reactors across the U.S., one at Maine Yankee, and three at San Onofre. What about the 125 additional U.S. reactors not accounted for on the map? Another two reactors will have to be accounted for, if Vogtle Units 3 and 4 in GA actually operate and generate irradiated nuclear fuel. That would then be 127 reactors across the country not accounted for by ISP's Fig. 4.2-3 in Rev. 0 of its CISF ER.
But then again, shockingly, NRC did not even include ISP's woefully inadequate route map in its own DEIS. NRC's secrecy concerning irradiated nuclear fuel transport routes into and out of the ISP CISF is shocking and outrageous, as well as a violation of NEPA. Apparently, NRC would like to keep the American people in the dark about the ISP CISF transport routes passing through, or near, their communities. This cannot stand.

Please address your woefully inadequate "hard look" under NEPA, re: this health- and environmentally-significant subject matter above.

And please acknowledge your receipt of these comments.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Kevin Kamps, Beyond Nuclear

Thursday
Oct012020

COMMENT: NRC PUBLIC MEETINGS -- STARTS TODAY: Texas waste site

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Draft Environmental Impact Statement public comment proceeding for Interim Storage Partners' Consolidated Interim Storage Facility at Waste Control Specialists in Texas begins Thursday, October 1 at 6pm Eastern. Call-in for audio connection: (888) 989-9268; Pass Code 5300047. Press *1 as soon as you get through, or at any point, to get in line to submit verbal comments for 3-5 minutes. See NRC's slideshow presentation here. More meetings will be held Tuesday, October 6, 2pm; Thursday, October 8, 6pm; Thursday, October 15, 11am (all times Eastern). See comprehensive action alert here. Help stop an environmentally unjust high-level nuke waste dump & thousands of Mobile Chernobyls nationwide!