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Tuesday
Aug022011

Significant degradation of plant safety reported at Davis-Besse atomic reactor

Despite possessing this photo showing severe corrosion on Davis-Besse's lid, NRC allowed the atomic reactor to continue operating to the brink of rupture in 2002.In a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission "Event Notification Report" dated July 26th, and posted on NRC's website July 27th, entitled "UNANALYZED CONDITIONS INVOLVING THE SAFETY RELATED DIRECT CURRENT (DC) SYSTEM," an "unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety" and a "condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function" were reported at the problem-plagued Davis-Besse atomic reactor. Two problems were identified, having to do with "an old design issue" going unresolved despite being identified during inspections. The first problem "could challenge the adequacy of electrical separation between the potentially grounded non-safety related equipment and the safety related batteries. The second problem posed the risk of "If a ground fault existed on one of these switches, the fault could be transferred from one power source to the redundant source, potentially impacting the ability of both safety-related DC power sources to perform their required functions." Davis-Besse has had a long litany of near-disasters, as chronicled in a Beyond Nuclear backgrounder. Beyond Nuclear, along with Citizens Environment Alliance of Southwestern Ontario, Don't Waste Michigan, and the Green Party of Ohio, has intervened against Davis-Besse's requested 20 year license extension, and won standing and the admittance of four contentions from NRC's Atomic Safety (sic) and Licensing Board. The contentions argue that (1) wind power alone could replace Davis-Besse; (2) solar photovoltaics alone could replace Davis-Besse; (3) a combination of wind, solar PV, and compressed air storage could certainly replace Davis-Besse; and (4) Davis-Besse severely underestimated the costs and casualties that would result from a catastrophic radioactivity release, a fatal flaw in its Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMA) analyses required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).